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Do newly founded firms pay lower wages? 
First evidence from Germany∗ 
Udo Brixy1, Susanne Kohaut2 and Claus Schnabel3 
Abstract 
Using a linked employer-employee data set for Germany, this paper ana-
lyses wage setting in a cohort of newly founded and other establishments 
from 1997 to 2001. While theory provides alternative explanations for 
higher or lower wages in newly founded firms, we show empirically that 
start-ups tend to pay lower wages, ceteris paribus. On average, wages in 
newly founded establishments are 8 percent lower than in similar incum-
bent firms. This negative wage differential is substantially smaller in eas-
tern than in western Germany. The wage differential is shown to decline 
over time as the newly founded firms become more mature. 
Zusammenfassung 
Unter Verwendung eines kombinierten Firmen-Beschäftigten-Datensatzes 
für Deutschland analysiert dieser Beitrag die Lohnsetzung in einer Kohorte 
von neu gegründeten und anderen Betrieben im Zeitraum von 1997 bis 
2001. Während theoretische Erklärungsansätze verschiedene Begründun-
gen für höhere oder niedrigere Löhne in neu gegründeten Betrieben lie-
fern, zeigen wir empirisch, dass Neugründungen ceteris paribus tenden-
ziell niedrigere Löhne zahlen. Im Durchschnitt liegen die Löhne in Neu-
gründungen 8 Prozent unter denen in vergleichbaren bestehenden Betrie-
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ben. Dieses negative Lohndifferenzial fällt in Ostdeutschland deutlich ge-
ringer aus als in Westdeutschland. Es zeigt sich, dass mit der Reifung der 
Betriebe im Zeitablauf das Lohndifferenzial zurückgeht. 
 
Nürnberg, Juli 2004 
 
Keywords: Wages, newly founded firms, linked employer-employee data, 
Germany 
JEL-classification: D21, J30 
 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 4/2004   
 
5
1 Introduction 
In recent years, newly founded firms (or business start-ups) have increas-
ingly received attention by academics as well as by economic policy. Quite 
a few studies have been published that analyze the success of newly 
founded firms over the years in terms of survival rates, employment 
growth, sales growth and other indicators of firm performance (see, e.g., 
Dunne et al. 1989 for the US, Storey 1994 for the UK, and Brüderl et al. 
1996 for Germany). Due to high and persistent unemployment, in Ger-
many a special focus has been on the employment effects of new firms 
(see, e.g., Wagner 1994, Brixy and Kohaut 1999, Almus 2002), and eco-
nomic policy strongly stimulates the founding of new firms in order to im-
prove the dismal labour market situation. 
Interestingly, the level and development of wages in newly founded firms 
have received little attention so far although they provide interesting in-
formation on the performance of new firms and on the quality of the jobs 
provided. Newly founded firms are usually equated with small firms, and 
for these we know that they tend to pay lower wages, ceteris paribus (Oi 
and Idson 1999). We do not know in detail, however, whether newly 
founded firms pay higher or lower wages than incumbent firms of the 
same size. We also do not know whether such a wage differential – if it 
exists – vanishes over time once the new business matures and how fast 
such a convergence in wages takes place (i.e. how long it takes until a 
new firm becomes an incumbent firm). 
This paper seeks to overcome this research deficit by analyzing the wage 
differential between newly founded and other firms in Germany in the pe-
riod 1997 to 2001. It makes use of a representative sample of establish-
ments that were founded in 1995/96 and that form part of a large-scale 
set of establishment data in Germany. After a brief discussion of the main 
hypotheses and the extant evidence in section 2, this unique data set is 
described in section 3. Econometric wage analyses are conducted in Sec-
tion 4, and the identified wage differential of the cohort of newly founded 
establishments is traced over time. Section 5 provides some concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future research. 
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2 Wages in small, in young and in newly founded 
firms 
There are several reasons why wages in newly founded firms may differ 
from those in incumbent firms (for a general discussion of the firm age 
and wages nexus see Brown and Medoff 2003). They imply alternative hy-
potheses on the direction and the persistence of this wage differential. In 
the following, some considerations suggesting higher wages in newly 
founded firms are presented first and are then contrasted by several ar-
guments for a negative wage differential. This theoretical reasoning will be 
supplemented by a brief look at the related empirical evidence. 
Since newly founded firms, by definition, have no current employees and 
cannot fill vacancies through training and promotion in internal labour 
markets, they need to attract employees from the external labour market. 
Potential employees will compare the compensation and working condi-
tions offered with what they receive from their current employers (or with 
what they are offered by other firms).1 If they take into consideration that 
newly founded firms are much more likely to expire than older ones, they 
can be expected to demand higher wages in the sense of a wage differen-
tial compensating for the increased risk of a job loss. Wage demands will 
also be higher if potential employees recognize that newly founded firms 
offer fewer fringe benefits (such as pension plans) than long-established 
firms. With a falling risk of failure (and an increase in fringe benefits) over 
time, the size of this compensating wage differential can be expected to 
fall (unless there is a sort of ratchet effect that makes employees stick to 
their relative starting wages). 
In contrast, wages in newly founded firms may be lower than in incumbent 
firms because of their lower ability to pay. Most new firms operate at such 
a small scale of output that they are confronted with an inherent cost dis-
advantage and thus need to pursue a strategy of compensating factor dif-
ferentials which includes paying lower wages (Audretsch et al. 2001). Put 
more general, in the start-up phase of a business it is essential for sur-
                                                
1 Lewin and Mitchell (1995, 33 f.) thus stress that the human resource strategy of a 
start-up business should focus most strongly on selection/sourcing and on compensa-
tion and reward systems (which may include equity participation of employees in 
start-ups). 
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vival to keep labour costs as low as possible, and any claim of inability to 
pay higher wages is much more credible (and more likely to be accepted 
by the employees) when made by a newly founded firm than by a long-
surviving firm. In this case, the new firm may not be able to poach em-
ployees from other firms but may rely more on attracting workers who are 
currently unemployed or out of the labour force. This selection and the 
lower wages offered do not necessarily imply that these employees are 
less qualified, since newly founded firms do not have to pay the wage 
premiums for tenure and firm-specific knowledge which employees in in-
cumbent firms command.2 Over time, this negative wage differential 
should become smaller since a firm’s ability to pay can be expected to rise 
and since its employees acquire tenure and valuable firm-specific human 
capital. 
These contrasting theoretical hypotheses suggest that an empirical inves-
tigation may be worthwhile. To the best of our knowledge, however, no 
empirical studies seem to exist that have explicitly addressed these issues 
with German or international data on newly founded firms. To be sure, 
there is a vast literature demonstrating that small firms pay lower wages 
for reasons that are not always perfectly well understood (standard refer-
ences include Brown et al. 1990 and Oi and Idson 1999; for Germany, see 
Schmidt 1995 and Wagner 1997). Since newly founded firms are usually 
small, it is fairly save to conclude that they also pay low wages, but it re-
mains an open question whether they pay higher or lower wages than in-
cumbent firms of the same size. 
There is also an emerging literature (consisting of not more than four 
econometric studies up to now) that tries to find out whether the age of a 
firm has an influence on the wages paid to its employees and that pro-
vides some information on the wage differential of young firms. With 
Dutch firm data, Audretsch et al. (2001) identify a positive impact of firm 
age on productivity and wages, even after controlling for the size of the 
                                                
2  There also may exist non-monetary incentives that help newly founded firms to hire 
employees in spite of lower wages. These include enthusiasm for the business idea 
and the attractiveness of a situation with flat hierarchies where structures can still be 
formed. Some employees could also speculate that they are first in line and therefore 
in a good position for a career within the firm. 
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firm. For the U.S., Brown and Medoff (2003) find that firms which have 
been in business longer pay higher wages, but tend to pay lower wages 
after controlling for worker characteristics. Similar results are obtained for 
western Germany by Kölling et al. (2002) who state that, if anything, 
younger firms seem to pay more ceteris paribus. Heyman (2004) investi-
gates the employer age-wage effect in Sweden and finds considerable 
heterogeneity across years, along segments of the firm age distribution, 
and across industries.3 All four studies, however, do not pay special atten-
tion to newly founded firms and do not follow an age cohort of firms over 
time. Such a line of investigation will be pursued now. 
3 The data 
The data used in this study is derived from two sources that are closely 
interrelated and together form an employer-employee data set. The em-
ployee side of the data set is the "German Employment Statistics" (some-
times also called the “German Social Insurance Statistics”). It requires all 
public and private employers to report certain information about every 
employee who is subject to obligatory social insurance, i.e. health and un-
employment insurance along with pension funds. Misreporting is legally 
sanctioned. The information collected is transformed into an establishment 
file that provides longitudinal information about the establishments and 
their employees and which is called “IAB Establishment Register”.4 A great 
advantage of this database is that it covers all establishments that employ 
at last one employee who is liable to social insurance. The attributes of 
each firm covered in this database are the number of employees, their 
sex, age, and qualification (four levels) as well as the wages and salaries 
paid and the exact duration of the engagement in days. Although these 
data refer to individuals, only aggregate data at establishment level were 
available to us. 
                                                
3  A different line of investigation is pursued by Brüderl et al. (1996: 101 f.) who investi-
gate how long it takes the founder of a firm to reach the personal income he or she re-
ceived in previous employment. 
4  IAB is an acronym for Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, which is the re-
search institute of the Federal Labour Office in Germany. 
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The employer side of our data set is given by the “IAB Establishment 
Panel”, a random sample of establishments from the comprehensive IAB 
Establishment Register drawn according to the principle of optimal stratifi-
cation. The stratification cells are defined by ten classes for the size of the 
establishment and by 16 economic sectors. This selection process means 
that the selection probability of an establishment increases with its size. 
Every year since 1993 (1996) the IAB Establishment Panel has surveyed 
the same establishments from all branches and different size categories in 
western (eastern) Germany. In order to correct for panel mortality, exits 
and newly founded establishments, the panel is augmented regularly. The 
questionnaire covers a wide variety of questions which can be used for our 
analysis, such as information on the legal form, the profit situation and the 
location of the establishment, the state of production technology and on 
bargaining coverage. Data are collected in personal interviews with the 
owners or senior managers of the establishments by professional inter-
viewers.5 
In 1997 a representative sample of establishments that reported under a 
new firm-identification-number in the employment statistics was drawn 
and integrated into the IAB Establishment Panel. From this sample 826 
newly founded establishments can be used in our analysis, 368 of which 
can be traced every year until 2001 (although not all of these establish-
ments provide information on all variables in every year). Each of these 
newly founded establishments hired its first employee between 1 July, 
1995 and 30 June, 1996. Our sample was restricted to establishments 
that had less than 200 employees in 19976 and that were in private own-
ership of one or more founders but were not owned by other firms, so 
there are no derivative foundations. The development of these newly 
founded establishments is contrasted with 5897 incumbent establishments 
from the private sector that had already existed in 1996 and had em-
ployed at least one person in 1997. Of these establishments 3207 could be 
traced in every year until 2001, the last year for which information from 
the employees’ and employers’ side is available. 
                                                
5  Details regarding the IAB Establishment Panel (including information on the question-
naires and how to access the data) are given in Kölling (2000). 
6  There is only one newly founded firm that was larger, on average the start-ups had five employees. 
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In our empirical analysis we predominantly make use of the data from the 
IAB Establishment Panel, thus more or less taking an employers’ perspec-
tive. In addition, exact data on the composition of the workforce and the 
number of employees as well as on the amount of wages and salaries paid 
in the establishment are supplied from the quasi-official German Employ-
ment Statistics via the IAB Establishment Register. The data are linked 
through a plant identifier that is available in both data sets. A short de-
scription of the data used with summary statistics can be found in an Ap-
pendix Table. 
4 Empirical analyses 
In order to empirically investigate the wage differential of firms founded in 
1995/96 we estimate OLS regressions for the period 1997 to 2001, mak-
ing use of stacked cross section models for each year as well as pooling 
the data. The dependent variable is the log of daily wages per (full-time 
equivalent) employee at establishment level. It is calculated by dividing 
the annual sum of all wages and salaries in an establishment by the sum 
of (calendar) days worked by all employees in this establishment. Since 
the number of days with part-time work is divided by 0.5, we in fact calcu-
late a sort of “full-time equivalents” of employment. Because of part-time 
work and fluctuations in employment our denominator is more precise 
than just using the number of employees at some point in time. The data 
stem from the “German Employment Statistics” and include all wages and 
salaries paid to each employee during a job up to the contribution as-
sessment ceiling of the social security system. Since higher earnings are 
censored at this ceiling, wages in firms of high-income sectors are under-
reported. Although there is a certain downward bias in our wage variable, 
this should not systematically and seriously affect our results on the wage 
differential.7 
                                                
7  This contribution assessment ceiling is relatively high, amounting to 148 € in western 
and 124 € in eastern Germany per calendar-day in 2001. As the wage variable used is 
calculated at the establishment level whereas the contribution assessment ceiling re-
fers to the individual level, there is no clear-cut truncation point which could be taken 
into account by choosing appropriate estimation methods (such as Tobit or truncated 
regression). At the other end of the spectrum, there was a small number of wages re-
ported that were obviously too low and that probably reflected errors in the data base. 
We therefore omitted all incomes that were lower than twice the wages paid for so-
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The main interest of our analysis is on the wage behaviour of newly 
founded firms, which are represented by a dummy variable indicating 
whether an establishment hired its first employee between 1 July, 1995, 
and 30 June, 1996. The other independent variables used are standard in 
wage regressions of this sort.8 They include the number of employees in 
the establishment and its square (which are expected to exhibit the well-
known positive but decreasing establishment size effect on wages) as well 
as a dummy variable indicating whether the establishment is a branch 
plant or subsidiary (thus probably paying higher wages than similar inde-
pendent firms). The structure of the workforce is represented by the em-
ployment shares of female, fixed-term and low-skilled employees (all of 
which are expected to receive lower wages) and of high-skilled and part-
time employees. Although there is no such thing as a unionized establish-
ment in Germany, it is necessary to control for the existence of sectoral or 
firm-level collective bargaining agreements, both of which are expected to 
raise wages. The ability to pay of an establishment is expressed by a 
dummy variable reflecting its subjective assessment of the (“very good or 
good”) profit situation. We also take into account the export share of an 
establishment and its state of production technology, both of which should 
be positively correlated with wages. Further controls refer to the existence 
of wage subsidies and the legal form of the firm, although we have no 
clear-cut priors on the likely influence of these variables on the wages 
paid. We also include ten industry dummies and three dummies for the 
degree of urbanization at the location of the establishment. Since wages in 
western Germany are still substantially higher than in post-communist 
eastern Germany and since both labour markets still differ considerably, 
we include a dummy variable for western Germany in the aggregate 
analysis and also provide disaggregated estimates for western and eastern 
Germany. 
                                                                                                                                                   
called “mini jobs” (for which only flat-rate taxes are paid). This lower threshold was 
21.18 € per day in 2001 in both parts of Germany. 
8  Although we have a relatively rich data set, selection of control variables was limited 
by the fact that information on some potential explanatory variables was either never 
asked (this is the case for the capital stock and for fringe benefits) or was not avail-
able in all years of our observation period (e.g., existence of a works council and profit 
sharing). 
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The results of the pooled estimations for the period 1997 to 2001 (which 
also include dummies for each year) are presented in Table 1. For Ger-
many as a whole and for its western and eastern part alike, almost all co-
efficients estimated are highly significant and of the expected sign. While 
the impact of control variables needs not to be discussed in detail, the 
principal result is of course the negative effect of the newly founded estab-
lishment dummy on log wages. Over the entire period and the full sample, 
wages paid in newly founded establishments were 8.0 percent lower than 
in other firms.9 In western Germany, the average wage differential 
amounted to 12.8 percent, whereas it was just 6.1 percent in eastern Ger-
many. This difference probably reflects the fact that wages in eastern 
Germany are generally about 20 percent lower, ceteris paribus (see the 
dummy variable for western Germany in column 1), and that new firms 
thus may have less scope for paying even lower wages there. 
In addition to the average effects over the whole period shown in Table 1, 
Table 2 presents the results of cross section estimations for each single 
year. The models estimated are almost identical to those shown in Ta-
ble 1,10 and by and large they are equally well determined. In order to 
economize on space, Table 2 just presents the estimated coefficients of 
the dummy variable for newly founded firms (full results are available 
from the authors on request). From the upper part of this table it can be 
seen that the point estimates of the wage differential tend to fall over 
time: While in 1997 wages were 13.4 percent lower in newly founded 
western German firms than in other firms, ceteris paribus, in 2001 the 
wage differential between these two groups of firms had narrowed to 
7.7 percent (and lost significance over time). In eastern Germany, the 
wage differential fell from 6.3 percent in 1997 to 4.9 percent in 2001. Fig-
ure 1 displays (in intervals of two years) the development of the wage dif-
ferential over time by presenting point estimates as well as 95 percent 
confidence intervals. Although the confidence intervals are quite large and 
                                                
9  The percentage wage effect is calculated from the estimated coefficient β as (eβ-
1)⋅100. 
10  The only differences are that the year dummies are not included, of course, and that 
for all years except 1999 (where information is lacking) a dummy variable on the exis-
tence of overtime work is included which always proves to be significant. 
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samples vary from year to year, there is some indication that (at least in 
western Germany) wage differentials narrow over time. 
Table 1: Determinants of wages in German firms, 1997-2001 
(OLS estimations; dependent variable: ln wage; pooled data) 
Variable Germany Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Constant 
 
Newly founded establishment 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
Establishment size 
(number of employees) 
Establishment size squared 
 
Branch plant/subsidiary 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
Female employees 
(percentage) 
Part-time employees 
(percentage) 
Fixed-term employees 
(percentage) 
High-skilled employees 
(percentage) 
Low-skilled employees 
(percentage) 
Covered by sectoral collective 
agreement (dummy: 1 = yes) 
Covered by firm-level collective 
agreement (dummy: 1 = yes) 
Firm receives wage subsidies 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
Profit situation 
(dummy: 1 = very good/good) 
3.9606** 
(454.62) 
-0.0837** 
(-11.46) 
0.00006** 
(15.63) 
-2.89e-09** 
(-11.07) 
0.0734** 
(15.15) 
-0.0030** 
(-30.60) 
0.0025** 
(17.06) 
-0.0005** 
(-3.41) 
0.0063** 
(41.53) 
-0.0010** 
(-12.30) 
0.1059** 
(23.32) 
0.0805** 
(13.06) 
-0.0268** 
(-7.20) 
0.0439** 
(11.44) 
4.2470** 
(311.73) 
-0.1368** 
(-8.62) 
0.00004** 
(9.48) 
-1.68e-09** 
(-8.08) 
0.0483** 
(8.39) 
-0.0030** 
(-19.97) 
0.0019** 
(8.64) 
0.0006 
(1.53) 
0.0069** 
(23.14) 
-0.0019** 
(-14.80) 
0.0908** 
(11.89) 
0.1016** 
(9.66) 
0.0250** 
(4.45) 
0.0327** 
(5.80) 
3.9199** 
(354.06) 
-0.0631** 
(-8.17) 
0.0004** 
(13.03) 
-1.60e-07** 
(-7.08) 
0.0917** 
(11.53) 
-0.0029** 
(-24.87) 
0.0035** 
(18.68) 
-0.0011** 
(-6.36) 
0.0062** 
(35.01) 
-0.0001 
(-1.53) 
0.0977** 
(17.63) 
0.0573** 
(7.80) 
-0.0560** 
(-11.86) 
0.0545** 
(10.74) 
Export share 
(percentage) 
0.0021** 
(19.81) 
0.0019** 
(15.87) 
0.0010** 
(5.05) 
Production technology 
(dummy: 1 = state of the art) 
0.0517** 
(12.96) 
0.0577** 
(9.72) 
0.0414** 
(8.03) 
Legal form of the firm 
(dummy: 1 = family-owned firm) 
-0.1915** 
(-42.71) 
-0.1963** 
(-28.81) 
-0.1705** 
(-28.69) 
Year 1998 
(dummy) 
0.0161** 
(3.13) 
0.0096 
(1.26) 
0.0197** 
(2.90) 
Year 1999 
(dummy) 
0.0393** 
(7.39) 
0.0326** 
(4.15) 
0.0420** 
(6.02) 
Year 2000 
(dummy) 
0.0478** 
(8.78) 
0.0424** 
(5.23) 
0.0507** 
(7.21) 
Year 2001 
(dummy) 
0.0696** 
(11.94) 
0.0547** 
(6.32) 
0.0794** 
(10.59) 
Western Germany 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.2365** 
(54.70) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Industry dummies yes** yes** yes** 
Urbanization dummies yes** yes** yes** 
n 
R2 
20177 
0.5966 
9721 
0.5321 
10456 
0.5295 
NOTE: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses, **/* denote statistical significance at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel. 
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Figure 1: Wage differentials of newly founded firms over time 
Point estimates from Table 2 and 95 percent confidence intervals 
 
These estimates, however, might be biased in various ways due to the 
failure (or non-reporting) of newly founded and other firms in the panel. 
On the one hand, those newly founded firms that paid higher wages (i.e. 
had a smaller wage differential in 1997) may not have survived until 2001 
due to excessive labour costs. On the other, the survivors should be those 
with the best business models, the most favourable economic prospects 
and the highest ability to pay throughout (i.e. those with higher wage dif-
ferentials already in 1997). In addition, the rest of the firms in the sample 
also changed from year to year due to panel attrition. Since the number of 
newly founded (of all) establishments fell from 667 (5611) in the 1997 re-
gression for Germany to 239 (2517) in 2001, it seems to make sense to 
pay a closer look to these surviving establishments in order to better iden-
tify the development of the wage differential over time. 
The lower part of Table 2 presents the results of estimations for a bal-
anced panel of 2517 firms that survived until 2001. It can be seen that in 
most years the estimated coefficients are in the same range as the esti-
mates for all establishments and do not seem to differ systematically.11 
                                                
11 We also tested this by including a dummy variable for surviving establishments and an 
interaction term of surviving and newly founded firms in the regressions on which the 
Percent
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2
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However, the significance levels of these coefficients are much lower (in 
particular in western Germany) which might reflect the fact that standard 
errors increase when the number of observations is reduced. From these 
results we may still conclude (albeit with less confidence) that newly 
founded firms tend to pay lower wages than incumbent ones and that this 
wages differential seems to narrow (or even disappear) over time. 
Table 2: Wage differentials of newly founded firms over time 
(coefficients of OLS estimations similar to Table 1) 
All establishments 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Germany -0.0890** 
(-6.79) 
-0.0720** 
(-4.64) 
-0.0779** 
(-4.51) 
-0.0858** 
(-4.38) 
-0.0541** 
(-2.70) 
Western Germany -0.1435** 
(-5.30) 
-0.1259** 
(-3.92) 
-0.1333** 
(-3.45) 
-0.0976* 
(-2.05) 
-0.0799 
(-1.92) 
Eastern Germany -0.0651** 
(-4.59) 
-0.0547** 
(-3.20) 
-0.0602** 
(-3.27) 
-0.0782** 
(-4.15) 
-0.0499* 
(-2.30) 
Survivors only 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Germany -0.0866** 
(-3.68) 
-0.0676** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0769** 
(-3.25) 
-0.0726** 
(-3.11) 
-0.0592** 
(-2.75) 
Western Germany -0.1045 
(-1.88) 
-0.1263* 
(-2.46) 
-0.1086 
(-1.87) 
-0.0889 
(-1.61) 
-0.0862 
(-1.84) 
Eastern Germany -0.0733** 
(-3.05) 
-0.0358 
(-1.43) 
-0.0566* 
(-2.49) 
-0.0573* 
(-2.50) 
-0.0412 
(-1.77) 
NOTE: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses, **/* denote statistical significance at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. In 2001, the number of observations and the estimated co-
efficients are not exactly identical between all establishments and survivors since the latter 
group includes only those establishments for which we have information in each single year 
(balanced panel). 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel. 
 
As a further test of robustness of our results we restricted the sample to 
small and medium-sized establishments that had less than 200 employees 
in our starting year 1997 (as noted above, all newly founded firms fall into 
this group). Although the estimations above with the full sample of all es-
tablishments included plant size as a determinant of wages, experience 
suggests that this may not suffice to capture all the effects of different es-
                                                                                                                                                   
upper part of Table 2 is based. Since both variables did not prove to be statistically 
significant we may conclude that the wages paid in surviving firms do not differ signifi-
cantly from those in other firms. This confirms the finding of Audretsch et al. (2001: 
818) that “differentials in employee compensation are far more attributable to firm 
size than to whether the firm ultimately survives or fails.” 
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tablishment sizes of newly founded and incumbent firms. Therefore it 
might be helpful to compare groups of firms that are more similar with re-
spect to establishment size. 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimations with the restricted sample, 
again concentrating on the coefficients of the dummy variable for newly 
founded firms. The pooled estimations for 1997 to 2001 shown in the first 
column confirm the significant negative effect of this dummy on log wages 
found in the unrestricted sample. It is interesting to see, however, that 
the wage differential is smaller once large incumbent firms are left out. In 
the sub-sample of establishments with less than 200 employees, wages 
paid in newly founded establishments were 5.7 percent lower than in simi-
lar incumbent firms in Germany (with the average wage differential 
amounting to 8.5 percent in western and 5.6 percent in eastern Ger-
many). 
Table 3: Wage differentials of newly founded firms: sample restricted to  
establishments with less than 200 employees in 1997 
(coefficients of OLS estimations similar to Table 1) 
Establishments 
< 200 employees 
1997-2001 
(pooled) 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Germany -0.0589** 
(-8.08) 
-0.0644** 
(-4.90) 
-0.0509** 
(-3.27) 
-0.0565** 
(-3.27) 
-0.0667** 
(-3.43) 
-0.0340 
(-1.71) 
Western Germany -0.0892** 
(-5.62) 
-0.0992** 
(-3.63) 
-0.0883** 
(-2.72) 
-0.0864* 
(-2.24) 
-0.0576 
(-1.21) 
-0.0394 
(-0.95) 
Eastern Germany -0.0571** 
(-7.37) 
-0.0580** 
(-4.07) 
-0.0472** 
(-2.75) 
-0.0603** 
(-3.25) 
-0.0721** 
(-3.80) 
-0.0401 
(-1.84) 
NOTE: Heteroscedastic-consistent t-values in parentheses, **/* denote statistical significance at the 
0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel. 
 
The cross section estimations for each year presented in the following col-
umns of Table 3 show again that the point estimates of the wage differen-
tial tend to fall and become less significant over time. In the sub-sample 
of establishments with less than 200 employees, after four years the wage 
differential between newly founded and incumbent firms in western Ger-
many has become statistically insignificant. In eastern Germany, this 
process takes five years. Put differently, this result implies that – at least 
concerning wages – it takes a new firm four to five years to become an 
incumbent firm. 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 4/2004   
 
17
5 Concluding remarks 
Our empirical analysis of a cohort of newly founded and other establish-
ments in Germany from 1997 to 2001 has indicated that start-ups tend to 
pay lower wages, ceteris paribus. This negative wage differential is sub-
stantially smaller in eastern Germany where the wage floor is lower and 
where firms may have less scope for paying wages that are still lower. The 
wage differential was shown to decline over time as the newly founded 
firms become more mature. In the fifth (and last) year of our observation 
period the wage differential had become insignificant in quite a few of the 
alternative samples investigated, but it needs additional waves of our 
panel data set before we can safely conclude whether and when this dif-
ferential disappears completely. 
The reasons for the negative wage differential found are difficult to iden-
tify and disentangle. One reason could be that newly founded firms rely 
more on workers (of a given quality) that are recruited from the pool of 
unemployed or from out of the labour force and that are less expensive, 
but currently we do not have reliable information yet on the origin of em-
ployees in an establishment. Lower wages might also be paid if the estab-
lishment compensates for this disadvantage by additional fringe benefits 
or by increased use of employee participation schemes. However, higher 
monetary fringe benefits should have been picked up by our comprehen-
sive wage variable, and our newly founded firms are not more likely to use 
employee participation schemes than other firms.12 Finally, ability to pay 
may play a role, and although we have included a crude dummy variable 
for the profit situation of the establishment (plus indicators of the state of 
technology and of the share of exports), these variables may capture abil-
ity to pay imperfectly, so that the dummy variable for newly founded firms 
could pick up part of this effect. 
                                                
12  For the year 1998, the first year with corresponding information, a simple probit esti-
mation was conducted with the existence of an employee participation scheme as the 
dependent variable and establishment size (plus its square), industry dummies and 
the dummy for newly founded establishments as explanatory variables. Neither for 
Germany nor for its western and eastern parts we found a significant influence of 
newly founded establishments on the probability that an employee participation 
scheme exists. 
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In addition to overcoming these data problems, a promising avenue for 
future research on the firm age and wage nexus would be to investigate 
how the wage of a given employee changes when he or she moves from 
an incumbent to a newly founded establishment. An equally interesting 
question is how the income of the owner of a firm evolves over time, 
compared to that of his employees and to his (fictional) income if he had 
stayed employed instead of becoming self-employed. Wages and income 
are still a largely neglected source of information on the performance of 
new firms and on the quality of the jobs provided that should be tapped 
more intensively. 
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Appendix 
Table: Summary statistics 
(pooled data for 1997-2001, n = 20177) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of daily wage per employee 
(full-time equivalents, in Euros) 
4.10 0.40 2.43 5.51 
Newly founded establishment 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.11 0.31 0 1 
Establishment size (number of  
employees, full-time equivalents) 
184.17 740.24 0.01 25145.42 
Branch plant/subsidiary 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.14 0.35 0 1 
Female employees 
(percentage) 
36.99 32.88 0 100 
Part-time employees 
(percentage) 
9.56 21.11 0 100 
Fixed-term employees 
(percentage) 
3.51 10.54 0 100 
High-skilled employees 
(percentage) 
6.14 13.80 0 100 
Low-skilled employees 
(percentage) 
20.18 29.59 0 100 
Covered by sectoral collective 
agreement (dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.50 0.50 0 1 
Covered by firm-level collective 
agreement (dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.10 0.30 0 1 
Firm receives wage subsidies 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
Profit situation 
(dummy: 1 = very good/good) 
0.31 0.46 0 1 
Export share 
(percentage) 
6.76 17.45 0 100 
Production technology 
(dummy: 1 = state of the art) 
0.69 0.46 0 1 
Legal form of the firm 
(dummy: 1 = family-owned firm) 
0.41 0.49 0 1 
Western Germany 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.48 0.50 0 1 
SOURCE: IAB Establishment Panel. 
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